Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has merged a neo-Ottomanist vision with pan-Islamic rhetoric into a coherent global strategy. This latter manifests in religious networks (state-controlled mosques and the Diyanet abroad), cultural diplomacy (language schools, heritage projects), media and propaganda (TRT channels, soap operas, diaspora outreach), and military projection (drone exports, foreign bases, proxy forces). The result? An expanding Turkish footprint from the Balkans and MENA to the Sahel and Central Asia, filling power vacuums as U.S. influence wanes. Starting by unpacking Turkey’s ideological foundations, this article analyzes the impact of Turkish instruments of influence amplified by a global geographic reach on the current multipolar world order.

Ideological Foundations

The AKP government has openly embraced a neo-Ottoman narrative and pan-Islamic fraternity, blending Turkish nationalism with Sunni Islam. This narrative portrays Turkey as the heir of Ottoman pluralism and piety, destined to lead Muslims and Turkic peoples from the Balkans through the Middle East to Central Asia.  By Evoking Turkish identity to the Ottoman Empire and the global umma AKP strategists  aim mobilize both domestic and diaspora loyalties making The line between official Islam and AKP politics blurred. Ankara’s foreign policy speeches often hint at revising the post-Ottoman status quo , for example, by questioning the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and invoking the old Misak-ı Millî territorial claims, underlining a revisionist impulse.

Tools of Influence

Turkey’s ideological project is backed by a full arsenal of soft- and hard-power tools. To this extent the state’s religious apparatus, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) and affiliated charities, play a central role. Once a modest secular institution, Diyanet has been “co-opted” by Erdoğan loyalists and turned into a foreign policy organ, financing mosque construction worldwide. Ankara has now sponsored over 2,000 mosques abroad, from Turkey’s embassy in Washington, D.C. to West Africa and Central Asia. Diyanet also brings foreign students and communities into its fold: Turkey’s Imam Hatip schools and Maarif educational network host thousands of Muslim youths from Africa, Asia and Europe. At the same time, over the years, Instabul by leveraging via Istanbul forums and massive aid projects (e.g. over $1 billion to Somalia’s relief programs) has been able to progressively cultivate relationships the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist NGOs.

Under the media and public standpoint, Turkey has carried out an aggressive propaganda. Besides state-backed broadcasters, popular culture represents a central influence tool. Turkish TV dramas (e.g. Diriliş: Ertuğrul) romanticize Ottoman or Islamic themes and draw huge audiences in Muslim-majority regions, burnishing Turkey’s image as a modern Islamic success story. Secondly, mosques, schools, and business councils have built an extensive diaspora network with great benefits in terms of further broadcasting Ankara’s message.

Leaving the soft power realm, there is the need to highlight how Turkey has been capable of shaping its hard power posture following unorthodox approaches. Drone diplomacy is a prime example. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and larger Akinci and Anka UAVs, very low-cost and battle-tested, have not only shifted warfare in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and Ukraine, but also opened markets and leverage for Ankara. Ankara sells or gifts drones, armored vehicles and training to allied countries, tying them into Turkey’s orbit. Lastly, it is necessary to mention the Turkish sprawling footprint where Turkey has quietly expanded its overseas base network, maintaining a major military base in Somalia, outposts in Qatar (since 2015) and Northern Cyprus (30–40,000 troops), troops in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, and forward bases in Syria, Libya and Iraq.

Figure 1: Turkish military presence beyond its borders (as of 2020). Ankara maintains thousands of troops and bases across the Balkans, Middle East and Africa, reflecting its regional power ambition

All the overlaying influence efforts are backed by a solid network of trade and aid. In Africa, Turkey’s “Year of Africa” (2005) began a drive of new embassies, flights by Turkish Airlines, and $billions in construction and aid Turkey invested heavily in Sudan, Somalia and the Sahel – financing highways, hospitals (e.g. Erdoğan Hospital in Mogadishu), schools, and even a Turkish military training campus there.

Strategic Geography

The backbone of Turkish ideology is represented by its diversified geographic reach. As hinted previously heavy-handed security moves framed into fiery rhetoric are a direct expression of Ankara’ s revisionist aspirations. These latter have pursued on several fronts In the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Turkey claims rights to Cypriot gas fields and has repeatedly sent navy vessels to challenge Greek and Cypriot energy exploration, provoking Greece-Cyprus-Israel-Egypt alignment against it. For what regards the Kurdish dossier without getting bogged down amid the complexity and heavy historical component of the Topic, Turkey has openly supported the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa for the Syrian front, whereas regarding Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous region Turkey has troops in Iraqi Kurdistan to counter both PKK militants and to protect its pipelines. Lastly, Turkey is mending fences with some neighbors: post-2023 it has quietly realigned with Israel (despite heavy public accusations regarding the Palestinian case) and Egypt for gas deals, and late-2023 rapprochements with Saudi Arabia and the UAE ease previous tensions.

In the Balkans, the Turkish foreign policy becomes almost exclusively soft power centered. It built or restored grand Ottoman-style mosques in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia, funded by Ankara’s Diyanet (e.g. Tirana’s new mega-mosque). Turkish-language schools and youth scholarships connect to Bosnian, Albanian and other Muslim communities. Ankara casts itself as protector of Balkan Muslims and a bridge between the region and the Muslim world.

Figure 2: Membership of the Organization of Turkic States (members in blue, observers in light). Turkey has pushed pan-Turkic cooperation through this forum and defense deals with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Arriving in Central Asia, economic and defense links are growing. Turkish firms built thousands of projects in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and Turkey pushes energy corridors linking Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey. Militarily, Turkey is selling drones, armored vehicles and technical know-how to these states. Ankara’s close military partnership with Azerbaijan (formalized in the 2021 Shusha Declaration) is presented as a model for Turkic unity. The Turkic Council (see Fig. 2) now meets regularly on joint exercises and infrastructure (the planned Middle Corridor railway)

Lastly as every imperialist power in the world, Turkey has a special strategic focus towards Africa showcasing great interventionism balanced out with security aid, business deals, and diplomacy. Ankara intervened militarily in Libya (2019–2020) and drafted a Mediterranean maritime pact with one Libyan faction, provoking neighbors but extending its reach to the Gulf of Sidra. It deployed trainers and drones to Somalia in 2017–18, built its largest overseas base in Mogadishu, and trained Somali forces to create a “common identity” with Turkey. Turkish troops and peacekeepers are also in Qatar, Iraq, and have advised Sudan’s military. Concurrently, Erdoğan has toured sub-Saharan states, signing military-security agreements in Niger (including a future base) and aiding coups-resistant regimes.

Implications for the Multipolar Order

It is not an easy task to evaluate the impact of Turkey’s neo-Ottoman strategy in a progressively more nuanced and complex multipolar world. By systematically filling strategic vacuums, often left by a retrenching West or overstretched regional powers, Ankara has positioned itself as a pivotal actor straddling Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa. The key element of Turkish’s success relies on the comprehension of the paradigm of a multipolar world. In this environment, no single actor can unilaterally enforce rules or resolve crises, which increases the importance of regional powers, middle powers, and ideological entrepreneurs like Turkey, India, Iran, Brazil, and others.

Domestically, Turkey’s ideological shift challenges NATO cohesion: its overtures to Russia (Sochi agreements), and simultaneous gas pipeline deals with Russia’s Gazprom underscore Ankara’s strategic autonomy, confirming the evolution from institutional alliances to transactional alignments. Now more than ever the greater the state’s ability to navigate systemic ambiguity the higher the chance of eyeing sustainable competitive positions. Beyond power politics, multipolarity has ushered in a new era of normative contestation, where divergent models of governance, religion, and historical legitimacy are weaponized to challenge the liberal international order. This shift is further reinforced by institutional decentralization via regional organizations, parallel financial architectures and bilateral deals.

Hopefully at this point is clear that conventional deterrence is dead. Now it is time for a hybrid type of competition. A competition where the powers, able to exert asymmetric influence through propaganda, cyber warfare and diaspora mobilization, will set the rules of the game.