Introduction
Weaponization of defense can be defined as a strategic framework through which the state takes advantage of its defense-related assets to secure political coercion, diplomatic leverage or economic gain. This framework can be implemented using a large scope of security resources, in the Turkish case there is the possibility to identify two main modus operandi:
Arms diplomacy: technology know-how, military training and weapons exports. Especially in the case of exclusive assets this approach contributes to building long term relations throughout which the importer progressively develops a strategic dependency that can be leveraged in order to shape geopolitical outcomes or receive support for specific agenda from the other party.
Chokepoint control: securing the control over geostrategic nodes permits to strengthen the bargaining power of the state in terms of diplomacy potentially increasing its capability of extracting concessions.
As a result, Turkey is able to transform defense cooperation into a bargaining chip obtaining diplomatic leverage or economic and political concessions in exchange for security guarantees.
The reach of Turkey’s defense industry
Taking as a reference the 2025 Presidency of The Republic of Turkey’s report on defense and aerospace industry there is the possibility to observe a remarkable transformation over the last two decades. From direct procurement (prior to 1990) to full indigenous production in 2010 Türkiye’s defense and aerospace exports have grown dramatically, rising from $248 million in 2002 to $7.2 billion in 2024 (a nearly 30-fold increase, see Figure 1). Indigenous production coupled with an aggressive international marketing, a diversified portfolio (as indicated in Figure 2) has put Turkey on the map as of the top 15 defense exporters globally. Arguably the flagship product of Turkey’s defense roaster is the Bayraktar TB2, a made medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), developed by Baykar Technologies. Its combat effectiveness, affordability, and rapid delivery timelines have secured Turkey over 30 export contracts, in particular:
Ukraine: at least 12 TB2 units had been delivered between 2019–2022 playing an essential part in the early phase of the conflict. Turkey was therefore able to showcase a certain degree of autonomy from NATO, its technological self-sufficiency and most importantly its ability to influence conflicts without boots on the ground.
Azerbaijan: during the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh war TB2s helped Azerbaijan decisively reshape the battlefield against Armenian forces. Besides the international attention Turkish was able to benefit from the open demonstration of its technology’s effectiveness and most importantly was able to consolidate its regional leadership aims.
Ethiopia: Turkey supplied TB2s during the Tigray Conflict marking an important step into the Turkish strategic road map towards Africa in terms of projecting power, securing influence, and offering alternatives to Western and Chinese arms suppliers.
Figure 1

Adapted from: 2025 Presidency of The Republic of Turkey’s report on defense and aerospace industry
Figure 2

Adapted from: 2025 Presidency of The Republic of Turkey’s report on defense and aerospace industry
Migration as a strategic leverage
Figure 3

Image Source: Brittanica
As indicated in Figure 3 Turkey bridges Europe and the Middle East. This strategic geographical position has shaped Turkey as a central transit hub for refugees and migrants. a large scope of different routes (with significant flows coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and parts of Africa converge inside Turkey granting access to the mainland and sea gateways in Europe Bulgaria and Greece. During the 2015 Immigration crisis Erdoğan comprehended the political leverage that could have been imposed over the EU. Turkey shifted from being merely a transit country to Europe’s de facto gatekeeper. By absorbing millions of refugees, Turkish strategic road map consisted of evolving the humanitarian responsibility into a pressure valve, extracting concession from the EU. This framework was implemented formally the EU–Turkey Statement of March 18, 2016 where Turkey by tightening border control, acceptance of returned immigrants for Greece and most importantly a concrete effort to dismantle criminal networks of human traffics received €6 billion in refugee assistance for Turkey, accelerated visa liberalization, and renewed EU accession talks. Later on Ankara openly transformed the overlaying agreement into a tool of statecraft. The modus operandi was articulated in three main phases:
1. Flow control: by tightening or loosening border and coast guard enforcement Turkey modulates migrant flows
2. Strategic timing: border policy shifts or migration threats are deliberately timed to coincide with disputes over military, financial, or political issues for instance:
March 2017: In the midst of diplomatic disputes with the Netherlands and Germany
3. Financial Framing: refugee hosting is framed as a service deserving EU payment.
Prospects
Worst Case Scenario
In this scenario Turkey is affected by the law of diminishing marginal returns, where reliance on coercive tactics both in terms of arms exports and immigration threats progressively appear less effective in terms of leverage. On the defense industry prospective diplomatic pushbacks and stringent export controls, implemented by EU members decrease, Turkey ‘s reach. Furthermore, this latter must come to grips with an increasingly deteriorating competitive position due to China technological warfare products, providing similar quality standards without geopolitical strings attached. On the migration front Turkey slowly distances itself from the label of Europe’s gatekeeper due to both internal and external pressure. Domestic tensions over refugee presence escalate, with economic stagnation amplifying public resentment. On the other hand, EU starts to invest in long term deterrence progressively scaling back financial concession to Turkey, that find itself paying the cost of a harmful strategic overreach.
Best case Scenario
In this case Turkey is able to prevent a strategic overreach by carefully calibrating technological capabilities and institutionalized partnership and framing them into a cautious diplomatic posture. The defense industry undergoes further evolution focusing on logistics, training, co-production, and maintenance infrastructure with the primary aim of transforming mere transactional agreements into long term partnerships. More specifically new-generation drones such as the Bayraktar Akıncı and Bayraktar TB3, equipped with indigenous precision-guided munitions like the MAM-T and MAM-L, are increasingly embedded within bilateral defense agreements across Africa and Central Asia, including contracts or cooperation talks with Niger, Chad, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, Turkey’s expansion into naval exports is exemplified by the MILGEM-class corvettes, with recent deliveries to Pakistan and negotiations underway with Indonesia and Bangladesh, positioning Ankara as a competitive player in littoral security solutions for developing maritime states. Tackling the immigration topic Turkey opens to a more constructive dialogue with EU where joint investment in humanitarian infrastructure, education for displaced populations, and digital border control mark Turkish openness improving Turkey’s diplomatic stance with great network effects.
Stability case Scenario
This scenario represents the maximum expression of the short-term interest dimension of the weaponization of defense. Agile and transactional Turkey constantly recalibrate its strategic position. Migratory pressures are exercised during moments of diplomatic tension (as previously indicated) but refrain from letting such episodes spiral into full rupture in order to maintain a certain degree of functional cooperation with the EU. The critical part of this strategy regards the defense industry where this latter remains politically charged losing market share to an increasingly fierce competition that coupled with a higher level of geopolitical volatility strongly limits the depth of long-term partnerships. As a result, the defense industry, despite the public financial funding, does not generate spillovers into the broader economy, negatively affecting long term planning. In this scenario Turkey, despite a weaker structural power, retains a relevant position into the geopolitical chessboard. Ultimately the key issue is the future sustainability of this arrangement.


