With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a series of ethnic and separatist conflicts broke out in areas bordering the Caucasus, often leading to a sharp increase in the number of casualties and refugees. A notable example is the Nagorno-Karabakh war, a region with a substantial Armenian component within its population that, in 1921, had been assigned by Soviet authorities to Azerbaijan. Following the referendum for the establishment of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), which was not recognized by Azerbaijan, between 1992 and 1994 the Armenians of Karabakh initiated a series of clashes that allowed them to gain control over the territory and establish a de facto unrecognized republic. The conflict ended in 1994 with the signing of the Bishkek Protocol, the result of a series of agreements held in Kyrgyzstan, with the Russian Federation acting as the main mediator. However, these agreements were repeatedly violated. After what some experts have called a “frozen conflict” period, hostilities resumed in 2020 and again in 2023, with Azerbaijan regaining control of the region.
Self-Determination versus Territorial Integrity
This dispute revealed several interesting aspects. First, one of the main reasons preventing these states from reaching an agreement was that the Armenian population in the region invoked the international principle of the self-determination of peoples, whereas the Azerbaijanis defended the principle of territorial integrity. The international community, in fact, never recognized independence and, following a series of 1993 resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, made it clear that in this dispute the principle of territorial integrity should prevail. Another characteristic element of the affair is that a region of such size represents a significant geopolitical lever for major international actors. Karabakh holds great strategic value in terms of location. Indeed, roughly 100 km from the region runs the Caucasus energy corridor, which allows, through transit across Georgia, the movement of large quantities of oil between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Most importantly, it constitutes the main energy route connecting Asia and Europe independently of Russia and Iran. For these reasons, there has been strong interest from Turkey, Europe, and the United States, but also from Russia and Iran.
Russia’s Opportunistic Behavior and Declining Influence
Analyzing Russia’s behavior, it becomes evident that Moscow adopted an opportunistic approach throughout the affair. First, it consistently sought to obstruct Western states while simultaneously supplying arms to both sides. Another lever used to preserve its sphere of influence was Russia’s role as mediator in Kyrgyzstan. In light of this, it can be assumed that the Russian Federation’s primary objective was to maintain a certain degree of dependency, mainly diplomatic, but also military, of the Caucasus upon itself. Over time, this dependency waned, both because the national sentiment of adherence to the Russian federal paradigm diminished, and because Armenia felt abandoned during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, despite being a member of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization).
Other factors that led Russia to lose control over the Caucasus include the growing desire for autonomy from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, after 2022, Armenia sought to diversify its military supplies by establishing contacts with India. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, increasingly distanced itself from Russia due to the expansion of its diplomatic autonomy and the strengthening of its relations with Turkey.
The U.S.-Brokered Peace Memorandum
After more than forty years of conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan are now ready to commit to a peace memorandum. The mediation of the White House convinced Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev to sign this agreement. The key provisions of the accord concern the creation of a corridor between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan region, whose development could be predominantly overseen by the United States. Furthermore, the memorandum envisions adherence to other joint agreements with the U.S., aimed at fostering cooperation in economic, particularly energy sectors. Consequently, with the concrete possibility of the United States obtaining a hundred-year concession over the Zangezur Corridor, Washington could exercise geopolitical control over the Caucasus area, effectively marking the end of Russian influence.
More specifically, the corridor would allow Azerbaijan to strengthen trade with Turkey and, most importantly, achieve total independence from Russia. This commercial route is suitable for transporting large quantities of goods between the Caspian Sea and Europe, enabling the bypassing of alternative routes. The economic implications for both Azerbaijan and Turkey are considerable. Turkey projects a significant increase in its export capacity, from $310 to $500 million annually, should the corridor project materialize.
A critical aspect lies in the fact that, according to some, this agreement resembles a total surrender of Armenia, revealing an internal imbalance. This is primarily due to the violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity in the area affected by the corridor, as well as to the disregard for humanitarian consequences following the most recent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan namely, the approximately 150,000 Armenians forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
Shifting Geopolitical Equilibria: The Role of Iran and the United States
As inferred from the above, the peace memorandum could completely reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus. Indeed, with the establishment of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (the Zangezur Corridor), not only would Russia lose its control over the area, but Iran as well. The latter is finalizing construction of the Aras Corridor, located on the border between Iran and Azerbaijan, which was intended to solve the issue of transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. A potentially successful conclusion to the peace accords would sideline this project and, consequently, Iran’s influence in the Caucasus.
Another issue linked to the opening of the corridor lies in the fact that the United States might exert strong pressure due to its proximity to Iran’s border, which Tehran perceives as potentially capable of “undermining the region’s security and lasting stability.” Russia and Iran thus face the challenge of operating in territories of nations increasingly determined to control alternative trade and energy routes originating from Eurasia.
Another actor worth considering is China, which has shown significant interest during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting regarding the situation in Armenia. The future scenario may thus involve potential ties between Armenia and China, both eager to launch a strategic partnership.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the geopolitical scope of the conflict is not limited to Azerbaijan and Armenia but extends to the major powers. The clear interest shown initially by China and Iran, together with that of Turkey, the U.S., and Europe, demonstrates that this region constitutes a key piece in the redefinition of global equilibrium. Other states, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, have expressed support for stabilizing the Caucasus as a precondition for strengthening energy security and ensuring the continuity of trade flows toward Europe. These nations also keep open the possibility of future investments in the area.
From another perspective, the peace process between the two countries cannot be interpreted as the definitive conclusion of the conflict but rather as its digression. Future competitions for control of the South Caucasus will render it a strategic crossroads where energy routes intersect with major investments stemming from the need for new infrastructure, thereby attracting the attention of the aforementioned powers.
In this context, the next stage of the game will be as much diplomatic as structural. Indeed, it will be in the hands of the aforementioned states to decide whether to create a space for cooperation or to generate a new ground for global rivalry. The prosperity, development, and security of Armenia and Azerbaijan will depend on this choice.
