The Gulf should be read as one coupled system, not two separate crises. The Strait of Hormuz is the primary chokepoint; the Bab el-Mandeb has re-emptied as a secondary effect of the same shock. We hold the coupling claim at LOW to MEDIUM confidence and test it against two alternatives rather than assuming it, but it is the best-supported reading of the evidence and it changes how any shock to either gate should be modelled.

The trigger was not Yemen. On 28 February 2026 a US-Israeli military campaign against Iran prompted Iran to close or heavily restrict Hormuz, the passage for roughly a fifth of the world's seaborne oil. Because there is no full-capacity alternative route out of the Gulf, this was a first-order supply shock rather than one disruption among several, and the IEA characterised it as the largest in the market's history. Within days, the major container lines withdrew from both gates in a single risk decision, re-abandoning a Red Sea corridor that was already fragile, which is why the coupling judgement is downgraded rather than asserted.

A central tension defines the present state. By 30 June, Brent spot had fallen to around 74 dollars while the EIA's supply model still implied roughly 105, a gap that is the most diagnostic single indicator in this assessment. The market is pricing an expected political settlement; a physical-flow model is pricing a strait that has not yet reopened at volume. We weight the physical and institutional evidence over the spot signal, while stating plainly that if the market proves right on timing, this outlook is too cautious.

The system now rests in a contested reopening under a 17 June interim understanding, mediated through Pakistan and Qatar, that neither party fully agrees on and whose own ambiguities are the trip-wires. Its provisions are held at MEDIUM confidence; a reported 24 to 28 June kinetic exchange is carried at LOW confidence, aggregator-sourced, and the conclusions are written to hold whether or not it is confirmed.

The core finding is an asymmetry. There is one fast door down, reclosure triggered by a single disputed act under a deal both sides read differently, and one slow door up, durable normalisation gated by mine-clearance measured in months and an insurance market that will not re-rate ahead of verified safety. Under coupling, a Hormuz reclosure re-empties the Bab el-Mandeb automatically.

The near-term outlook is continued residence in the current standoff (likely, MEDIUM confidence). Reclosure is roughly even odds at LOW to MEDIUM confidence; durable normalisation within 2026 is unlikely (MEDIUM). The decision-relevant question is whether the Doha process can convert an ambiguous ceasefire into an operable one before one of its own trip-wires fires again, and whether the slow physical work of reopening can outrun the next disputed sentence.

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