It seems almost impossible to frame the Israel-Iran conflict without putting into the equation the extended network of Iranian proxies. However, we should get familiar with this reality, a reality that, as rough as it might be, represents the direct outcome of a pragmatic vision. A vision that did not appear overnight but manifested itself in stops and starts, progressively highlighting the structural weakness of the Iran deterrence model. This latter, probably too idealized, is starting to come to grips with internal contradictions, overstretch, ideological misalignment, and growing local resentment.
Introduction
Iran’s proxies represent the purest form of expression of the imperial Iranian heritage. Over history, indeed, the enforcement of proxy has been a common practice for various empires. First, the Roman Empire, towards the end of its existence, leveraged the goths to safeguard its borders against the invasion of barbaric tribes. Then as now the essential precondition for the existence and related enforcement of a proxy is the presence of a common strategic objective, in this case, the need to neutralize the hegemonic aims of Israel. These later trigger a state of necessity where apparently insurmountable differences are being easily archived. Indeed, one element that is unfortunately too often overlooked is the religious heterogeneity inside the axes of Resistance where Shias and Sunnis operate under the same purpose. Through a Foucauldian lens, Iran’s proxy network is not just a tool of domination but a system of power that produces identities, narratives, and resistance. Groups like Hezbollah or the Houthis aren’t mere puppets, actively shaping the context in which they operate. This creates a constant tension between control and autonomy: Iran governs through ideology and support, but the proxies act with their own logic and local agendas. As Foucault teaches, power and resistance are co-constitutive. Iran’s strength lies not in direct rule, but in managing this unstable, productive tension.
Overview of main Iran’s proxies
Hamas born during the first Intifada (1987), as a derivation of the Muslim Brothers (Sunnis) deliberately rejects the legitimacy of the state of Israel having as primary purpose to free the Palestinian territory. Having entered the political scene with the elections of 2006, Hamas over the years has received the support, both under a military and financial standpoint, from various Middle Eastern actors, mainly Qatat and Iran. Over the last years Israel was capable of severely weaking its structure and capabilities. However, despite the great attempts of Israel Hamas has not been completely eradicated. These two opposing parties are bound by a pathological relationship, where given the initial assumptions (Israel wants to eliminate Hamas ensuring Gaza’ s security, Hamas wants to annihilate Israel) Israel cannot exist without Hamas and vice versa.
Hezbollah (God’s party), formally born in 1982 as a direct outcome of the war in Lebanon has a completely different relationship with Iran. This latter has played an important role in the creation of the Hezbollah as a derivation of the Amal movement. Hezbollah represents an essential actor in the Iranian network of proxies managing with the IRGC (Islamic Guard Revolutionary Corps) the Quds ( a division of IRGC that operates outside Iran’s borders). In order to understand the special relation between Israel and Iran there is the need to introduce the term “velayat-e faqih” which literally translates into 2guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” indicating the absolute obedience to the spiritual guide of the Ayatollah. Despite being praised for its long history of warfare (thus its related experience combined with sophisticated military equipment), its ability to trigger popular mobilizations and most importantly its strategic position (that permits to create pressure on the north Israeli border) Hamas is currently in a tough spot not even being able to impose its influence inside the Lebanon’s border. Given this condition of relative weakness, Hezbollah has focused its strategic efforts in coordinating and training jihadist militias that from the infamous 7th of October 2023 has bombarded Israel. The Hezbollah’ s penetration in Iraq (already started with the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the later war between Iran and Iraq) represents an incredible strategic win. Its positioning permits to maintain a certain degree of continuity with Syria representing a buffer zone and most importantly subtracting Iraq to the Turkish and American influence.
Houthis, (Ansar Allah God’s partisans), as of now are by far the most active Iran’s proxy. Their strength relies in their strategic positions where they can attack commercial ships going through the Bab- El Mandeb strait, one of the most important chokepoints, internationally wise. The relation between Iran and the Houthis officially started in 2009 is mainly driven by the Saudi rivalry another important actor in the war of Yemen. Iran leverages the Houthi capabilities to increase the pressure on Saudi Arabia while formally continuing to respect the 2023 normalization deal.
The problem behind Iran’s proxy network
It might be argued that the limit of Iran’s proxies is determined by a contingency of elements such as operational vulnerabilities, economic and resource constraints and strategic isolation. All the overlaying points are valid. However this narration excludes the core issue, the problem that poses real threats to the future of Iran’s asymmetric warfare model: proxy autonomy and diverging agendas. During the Assad regime in Syria Iran’s proxies stood against the Sunni Alawi regime, supported by Theran, in various occasions. To this extent, a remarkable precedent occurred between the 80s and the 90s where the alliance between Damascus and Tehran had to bear a strategic incongruence given Hezbollha’s willingness to antagonize the Amal movement. This episode represents a strong signal of autonomy of the Lebanese movement. This latter might be unwilling to act as a mere proxy of Iran being increasingly concerned by the decreasing support from the domestic audience. Hezbollah after an accurate cost-benefit valuation has maintained its alignment with Iran exiting from a subordinated position. This shift might represent a strategic liability for Iran signaling that Hezbollah and Iran’s balance of power might be strongly related to Hezbollah’s need to survive. The Syrian case is also responsible for a friction of the Iran-Hamas relations. Indeed, during the Syrian civil war Hamas openly supported the militias that were contesting the regime triggering a severe reaction from Iran that implement a substantial cut off in terms of financial and military support to Hamas. Lastly, Houthi are another clear example of the issue of proxy autonomy. Unlike other proxies, they do not share doctrinal Twelver Shiism, but rather follow Zaydi Islam, a different branch of Shiism traditionally more moderate and more rooted in Yemeni history. Houthis are not ideological clones of Tehran. Their rhetoric, strategy, and long-term goals are grounded more in Yemeni nationalism and anti-Saudi sentiment than in allegiance to the Islamic Republic. The Houthis are partners of convenience, not ideological subordinates. Iran has enabled their rise, but it cannot command their future. All the overlaying elements combined with their strong international profile being aware of the of the scale and strategic depth of their belligerent acts make them an unpredictable actor sparking doubts regarding their future relationship with Iran.
