Year 2001, December 11, the acronym is WTO. The geopolitical context saw as its epicenter the hegemonic power represented by the United States of America. The request, naively interpreted by world leaders under every plausible aspect, was China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, unaware that they were nourishing a power which, within a few years, would not only grow at a galloping pace, but would do so with extreme consistency, order, and strength. What was once an apparently harmless developing country has, in less than a quarter of a century, transformed into a military, industrial, political, and technological power capable of posing a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. “The small and meek lizard that the eagle brought into its nest has become a dragon” (Emilio Mola, Dentro al grande gioco).

Introduction

On the occasion of the memorable visit in November 2017 of U.S. President Donald Trump to the Forbidden City, there was a light-hearted exchange with Xi Jinping. The Chinese President’s history lesson reached its peak with his remark, in response to Trump’s claim that Egyptian civilization was the oldest, that China is the only continuous culture in the world, the descendants of the dragon. So ancient, in fact, that while a small village on the banks of the Tiber was just beginning to assert itself over its neighbors in Latium, a general known as Sun Tzu was writing a treatise destined to influence military strategy around the globe: The Art of War. A famous quote from this work reads: “Feign disorder, never be without bait to lure the enemy, simulate inferiority to encourage his arrogance: his lust will hurl him upon you.” More than twenty-five centuries later, this mantra, cleverly observed by the Red Dragon and ignored by the United States, led to the laying of the foundations, by the end of 2001, for the century’s defining rivalry between the USA and China. From that moment on, China’s influence became increasingly visible across the Value Chain. A clear example emerged with the paralysis that followed the lockdowns during the 2020 pandemic, a result, above all, of the multiple strategies adopted by China. One of the most iconic undertakings of the 21st century is the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. Its goal was the establishment of a “New Silk Road.” This initiative embodies the ambition to overturn the hegemonic order imposed by the world’s leading economic power, through the construction of a new world-system capable of competing with the one skillfully designed by the United States, an order consolidated through the Bretton Woods agreements and sustained over time by a series of measures aimed at promoting so-called “global well-being.”

Belt Road Initiative

In 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched. It consists of two main components: the Belt, referring to the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), a railway corridor stretching from China through Central Asia and Russia all the way to Western Europe; and the Road, representing the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), which extends from southern China to Venice, passing through Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Mediterranean. One of the primary objectives is to connect 65 countries that account for more than half of the world’s GDP and 70% of the global population. As of today, about 150 countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Chinese government and the BRI agency. The principles underpinning cooperation with China include financial integration, free trade, exchange of ideas, promotion of political coordination, and facilitation of connectivity. Despite the declared aim of promoting economic prosperity, the political and military implications of the project are clearly perceived. Another key initiative promoted by China, in which it holds roughly 30%, is the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Officially announced by Xi Jinping in 2013 and operational since 2016, it represents a fundamental piece of China’s broader strategy to challenge the existing global balance in development financing. The bank was established to address the infrastructure deficit in developing countries. Unsurprisingly, this has met with significant resistance from the United States. One of the main factors justifying the expansion of the BRI is the chronic shortage of infrastructure in many parts of the world, particularly in South Asia and Africa. Rapid urbanization and growing demand for energy and logistics have made substantial investments in key sectorssuch as transport, energy, and telecommunications, an urgent necessity. According to World Bank estimates, between 2015 and 2020, developing countries would have required annual investments of around $819 billion. However, the actual funding provided by multilateral development banks has proven largely insufficient: in 2013, official support for infrastructure projects amounted to about $60 billion, with the World Bank alone providing $11.7 billion. Within this context, China’s activism has emerged prominently. Through the AIIB and other channels, it has promoted and carried out numerous infrastructure projects, often involving direct participation of Chinese firms and capital. Thus, the Belt and Road Initiative, alongside the creation of the AIIB, appears as a strategic tool through which China seeks to strengthen its global influence, consolidate economic and political ties with third countries, and offer an alternative model of cooperation to the Western one.

Figure 1 BRI AND AIIB

Choke Points

When discussing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is essential to recognize that one of its major strengths lies in its strategic positioning around some of the world’s most critical chokepoints. A chokepoint refers to a geographical area through which the movement of military forces or commercial transport can be controlled. China’s aim in consolidating its maritime presence is to redefine global shipping routes and assume a more central role in international maritime logistics.This is being pursued, first and foremost, through the long-term management of numerous strategic ports located at key nodes of global trade routes, for example, the Malacca Gateway and Obock in Djibouti. Another key lever through which China seeks to advance its global expansion is the control of energy sources. It is for this very reason that China has built a military base in Djibouti, to strengthen its presence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This strait, located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, links the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. According to estimates by the U.S. Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency, approximately 9% of the world’s oil and 11% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit through this strait daily. Initially planned as a logistical outpost to provide rest for troops involved in humanitarian missions, the base in Djibouti was soon converted into a fully operational military and naval installation. In parallel, the Suez Canal Economic Zone in Egypt has been integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative from the outset, reinforcing the strategic importance of a maritime passage that, during the 19th and 20th centuries, was fiercely contested by the great colonial powers. Another crucial node within the BRI framework is the Strait of Hormuz, a vital conduit for global energy trade. Roughly one-third of the world’s LNG and one-quarter of globally consumed oil pass through this narrow waterway.

Figure 2 Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal

Implications on MENA region

In light of the foregoing, the implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for countries in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region are complex, and future scenarios remain difficult to predict. First and foremost, China’s growing economic influence is unfolding on an unprecedented scale. This process, meticulously orchestrated through Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), may generate mounting pressure on traditionally hegemonic Western powers. In other words, the BRI may serve as a lever to draw highly dependent states toward China, creating a new network centered around Beijing. This process, known as peripherization, reflects the logic by which capital and states seek new opportunities for profit, productive advantages, or strategic alliances in more marginal territories. Applying this logic to the BRI means recognizing that, although formally presented as a development initiative, the infrastructure built by China could redefine the current capitalist order, ushering in a new geopolitical phase. Within the MENA context, the Maritime Silk Road Initiative appears poised to have a greater impact than its overland counterpart, connecting key ports along the Arabian Gulf (such as those in Oman and Dubai) and the Red Sea (Djibouti and Egypt). The implications for these states can be categorized as follows: economic dominance, the creation of new operational models, and financial influence.

A critical factor that should not be overlooked is the potential risk for these states to fall into debt trap diplomacy, thereby granting China an extremely advantageous and structurally influential position, one that could undermine their political and economic autonomy. Debt trap diplomacy becomes evident, for example, when a country becomes insolvent after taking on significant loans for BRI-related infrastructure projects and is consequently forced to relinquish control of key logistical hubs, as occurred in Djibouti, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Ultimately, the greatest risk is that a state may find its foreign policy decisions heavily constrained by the imperative not to jeopardize its relationship with Beijing. In a world where geoeconomics drives global power dynamics more than traditional geopolitics, the challenge for MENA countries will be to seize the opportunities presented by the Belt and Road Initiative, without falling into a new form of dependency, where infrastructural development comes at the cost of tacitly surrendering sovereignty.

Bibliography

World Bank. (2025) Belt and Road Initiative

Weiss, M. A. (2017). Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Congressional Research Service.

Liu, J. (2021). BRI logistics and global infrastructure. In M. Kenderdine & D. Mitra (Eds.), The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance Routledge.

Sarieddine, T. (2021). Middle Kingdom enters Middle East: A world-systems analysis of peripheralization along the Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Journal of World-Systems Research, 27(1), 177–201.

Mola, E. (2025). Dentro al grande gioco: Orientarsi nel caos degli equilibri internazionali. Fra storia, guerre e scenari futuri. Rizzoli.