The Italian Senate’s Draft Law S.1004, introduced by the Lega in January 2024, proposes adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism as statutory law. While the bill is ostensibly a response to increasing antisemitic incidents, it blurs the distinction between antisemitism and legitimate political criticism of Israel. Parliamentary debates have underscored anxieties that slogans such as “Free Palestine” could be construed as antisemitic, especially in the context of Israel’s ongoing military actions in Gaza. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the bill’s text, the legislative debates, and relevant European precedents. It contends that, while safeguarding Jewish communities is essential, the proposed legislation threatens both freedom of expression and the broader fabric of democratic pluralism.

 On January 30, 2024, Senator Massimiliano Romeo introduced Draft Law S.1004 in the Italian Senate, with co-signatories Daisy Pirovano and Giorgio Maria Bergesio, all members of the Lega (LSP-PSd’Az) parliamentary group. The proposed legislation, spanning three articles, seeks to formally integrate the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, originally adopted in Bucharest in 2016 and subsequently endorsed by the European Parliament in 2017 and the Council of the European Union in 2018, into Italian statutory law. While Italy politically supported the IHRA definition in 2020, it has not previously endowed it with legal force. Article 1 anchors the rejection of antisemitism within the framework of Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, explicitly referencing the IHRA’s definitional criteria. Article 2 stipulates the issuance of a decree by the President of the Council of Ministers to establish a national database of antisemitic incidents, regulate the removal of internet content, and introduce targeted educational and police training initiatives. Article 3 empowers authorities to withhold authorization for public assemblies when there is a “grave potential risk” of antisemitic expression. The explanatory memorandum situates the proposed law in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack and the ensuing conflict in Gaza. It contends that anti-Zionism often serves as a facade for antisemitic sentiment. This rhetorical framework effectively conflates racial animus with political dissent, thereby introducing a degree of interpretative ambiguity into the legislation’s application.

Parliamentary Debate and Contestation

The 1st Permanent Commission (Affari Costituzionali) reviewed the bill in August 2025. Senator Pirovano (Lega), serving as rapporteur, underscored the ongoing prevalence of antisemitic violence both in Italy and across Europe, and referred to the “grave humanitarian situation” in Gaza. He presented the proposed legislation as a necessary safeguard for Jewish citizens amid increasing hostility. Members of the opposition raised significant objections. Senator De Cristofaro (Misto-AVS) criticized the conflation of antisemitism with anti-Zionism, cautioning that the legislation could criminalize political criticism of Israel. He also noted the timing of the bill’s discussion, which coincided with the Israeli Prime Minister’s announcement regarding the annexation of Gaza. This, he argued, suggested the Italian government was prioritizing legislative measures to suppress dissent over its humanitarian or diplomatic obligations.Senators from the Partito Democratico (PD) and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) also voiced concerns. Senator Maiorino (M5S) warned that the use of contested definitions of antisemitism could facilitate “preventive censorship” of public demonstrations, undermining constitutional freedoms. Others highlighted the inconsistency of a government that previously abstained from supporting the Liliana Segre Commission against racism (2019) now advancing a legislative proposal that some consider potentially repressive. By contrast, senators from Lega and centrist parties argued that the bill merely reinforced existing protections against hate crimes. Senator Tosato (Lega) acknowledged the broad scope of Article 3 but maintained that it was necessary to regulate slogans and demonstrations historically associated with antisemitism. Proponents insisted that criticism of Israeli government policies would remain permissible; however, the extent of this protection would ultimately depend on the interpretation and discretion of law enforcement authorities.

The Free Speech Dilemma: From Hate Speech to Political Dissent

The most controversial aspect of S.1004 is found in Article 3, which empowers authorities to prohibit public gatherings based solely on a perceived “potential risk” of antisemitic slogans. This approach significantly lowers the standard for restricting demonstrations and stands in tension with the constitutional protections for freedom of expression (Article 21) and assembly (Article 17) guaranteed under Italian law. Whereas prior legislation, such as the Legge Mancino of 1993, addressed hate speech after its occurrence, S.1004 adopts a preventive stance, enabling authorities to impose restrictions on political assemblies in advance. In practice, this shift means that demonstrations supporting Palestinian rights, particularly those employing slogans like “Free Palestine,” could face prohibition. The IHRA’s working definition of antisemitism includes examples such as “denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination” or describing the existence of Israel as a “racist endeavor”, both of which significantly overlap with common themes in pro-Palestinian rhetoric, such as characterizing Israel’s policies as apartheid or settler-colonialism. As a result, political slogans that are widely used in these contexts risk falling afoul of online butal framework.Additionally, Article 2(b) mandates the monitoring and removal of “antisemitic hate speech” online, but lacks precise safeguards to prevent overreach. This raises concerns that the provision could encompass not only genuinely hateful content but also legitimate journalistic or political critique of Israeli government policies. When combined with the proposed establishment of government databases to document antisemitic incidents, S.1004 could institutionalize a climate of surveillance that threatens to chill political expression.

Geopolitical Context: Gaza, Italy, and the European Trend

The Italian bill cannot be properly understood outside the wider context of current geopolitical realities. In the aftermath of October 2023, Israel’s intensified military actions in Gaza led to a staggering number of civilian casualties, drawing widespread condemnation from human rights organizations for what they identified as violations of international humanitarian law. As international protests erupted, with many labeling the events as “genocide” and demanding accountability, Italian lawmakers are now poised to introduce legislation that could effectively undermine expressions of solidarity with Palestinians, an action whose timing seems especially consequential.Italy’s legislative path is not unique; it closely follows trends seen across Europe, particularly in states that have adopted the IHRA definition of antisemitism. In Germany, for instance, authorities have prohibited several demonstrations on the grounds of alleged antisemitic risk. The United Kingdom has witnessed university debates on Israel/Palestine being subject to administrative intervention. By moving to formally adopt the IHRA definition, Italy appears to be aligning itself with a security-driven approach that privileges international alliances over domestic pluralism and open debate.

Conclusion: Protecting Jews or Silencing Palestine?

S.1004, as currently formulated, presents a serious dilemma for the balance between minority protection and the preservation of democratic freedoms in Italy. By incorporating the IHRA definition, the bill introduces a problematic ambiguity, essentially collapsing the line between actual antisemitism and legitimate political criticism of Israel. This ambiguity is particularly concerning given the ongoing crisis in Gaza and the surge of public demonstrations and solidarity campaigns. Should S.1004 pass without amendment, there’s a real risk that expressions such as “Free Palestine” could be interpreted as hate speech under the law, potentially criminalizing dissent and chilling political activism. This would not only institutionalize restrictions on freedom of assembly but could also encourage an atmosphere of surveillance over those participating in political movements. The bill doesn’t just address existing legislative gaps; instead, it threatens the very foundation of pluralism within Italian democracy. The key challenge for lawmakers is to draw a clear distinction between antisemitism, a form of racism that demands unequivocal opposition and criticism of the policies of a nation-state, which remains a fundamental aspect of democratic discourse. If this distinction is not rigorously maintained, there is a risk not only of silencing advocacy for Palestinian rights but also of undermining the broader credibility and effectiveness of anti-racist legislation.

Notes

1. DDL S.1004, XIX Legislatura, presentato il 30 gennaio 2024 (Senato della Repubblica, Fascicolo Iter).

2. European Parliament, Resolution of 1 June 2017 on combating antisemitism (2017/2692 RSP).

3. DDL S.1004, Art. 1.

4.DDL S.1004, Art. 2–3.

5. Resoconto della 1ª Commissione (Affari Costituzionali), Seduta n. 370, 5 agosto 2025.

6. Ibid., intervento del sen. De Cristofaro (Misto-AVS).

7. Ibid., intervento della sen. Maiorino (M5S).

8. Ibid., intervento del sen. Tosato (Lega).

9. IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, adopted 26 May 2016, Bucharest Plenary.