Sudan is today the scene of the largest displacement crisis in the world. The war that broke out in Sudanese territory represents the culmination of 70 years of chronic instability. From the al-Bashir regime and the genocide in Darfur to the failed democratic transition and the simultaneous outbreak of conflict between the RSF and SAF, the constant element of the narrative has always been the same: victims, millions of displaced people, and regional fragmentation. This analysis shows how gold, the new driver of warfare, perpetuates the conflict and fuels not only a war between generals but also a progressive systemic collapse, instead of acting as a lever for economic development.

The historical roots of the Sudanese conflict

Sudan, certainly known for its vast size, is the third largest country in Africa and effectively represents a crossroads between sub-Saharan and North Africa. Another element that makes this country extremely central is its access to the Red Sea, making it a strategic point for trade routes. From a demographic perspective, Sudan is highly heterogeneous in ethnic and religious terms. Around 50 ethnic groups coexist, the result of a mixture of Arab and African cultures. The majority of the population is Muslim, with Arab groups distributed in the North, while non-Arabized populations are mainly located in Darfur and Kordofan.

A first turning point in Sudan’s history occurred in 1956 when, following the 1953 agreements between the United Kingdom and Egypt, the country became independent, ending the Anglo-Egyptian condominium established in 1899. Since then, the country has gone through various phases of conflict and institutional weakness, intensifying phenomena related to the marginalization of southern regions and the concentration of political power and capital in the North.

This division deepened further in 1989 when Omar Hassan al-Bashir carried out a coup and overthrew the government. This marked the beginning of the redefinition of Sudan as an Islamist and militarized ideological state. Islam became a structural component, accompanied by strong militarization and repression of opposition. Control also extended to resources and thus to the main sectors of the Sudanese economy. The conflict with the South was consequently reframed in radical terms, leading to the spread of new regional tensions. Among the triggering factors were political marginalization of the region and exclusion from state resources.

A further development occurred with the conflict in Darfur, where protest uprisings were managed by the al-Bashir regime by delegating local Arab militias to implement a policy of terror, including serious episodes of genocide against non-Arabized communities, mass rapes, and forced deportations between 2003 and 2005. It is estimated that around 200,000 people were killed, while more than 2.5 million were forced to leave their homes.

The Janjaweed militias, later reorganized from 2013 into the Rapid Support Forces, were tasked with suppressing the insurgency in Darfur. They operated separately from the regular army, received impunity, access to resources, and political recognition, thereby consolidating their military and economic autonomy in their areas of control. They were also deployed, together with the Sudan Armed Forces, in the civil war in Yemen and in other international operations.

These events did not go unnoticed, and the International Criminal Court later indicted al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. What happened highlights a fundamental point. Sudan’s structural problems led to a succession of civilian and military governments marked by strong instability and a growing inability to include significant parts of the population in a shared political project. This was further reflected in 2011, when the secession of South Sudan created an independent state.

Figure 1.

SAF and RSF from transitional government to armed conflict

In 2019, al-Bashir fell, but this did not produce a real break with entrenched power structures. The Sudan Armed Forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces, commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, took leadership of the Sovereign Council together with civilian representatives.

After al-Bashir’s removal and the fall of the National Congress Party, a civilian military transitional government was established to guide the country toward democratic elections. However, this democratization process was abruptly interrupted in October 2021, when the military establishment dissolved the transitional government through a coup and repressed pro-democracy movements. Several civilian leaders, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, were arrested.

In November, the Sovereign Council was reconstituted under al-Burhan, and Hamdok was reinstated after signing an agreement to form a technocratic government. The agreement excluded the civilian coalition Forces of Freedom and Change, allowing the military to retain significant control over the transition. In January 2022, amid intensifying protests, Hamdok resigned, worsening the institutional crisis.

In December 2022, the armed forces signed a framework agreement with civilian groups for a new transition path. However, growing tensions between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces delayed its finalization and eventually escalated into armed conflict in April 2023 over political and military control.

The first clashes began in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 and spread to strategic regions such as Darfur, Gezira, and Kordofan. Currently, the Sudan Armed Forces control northern and eastern areas and parts of the capital, while the Rapid Support Forces have proclaimed a parallel authority in Darfur and along the southwestern border.

The humanitarian consequences are severe, with tens of thousands of deaths and millions of internally displaced persons. In 2024, the Rapid Support Forces reportedly exploited famine risks and resource shortages to force recruitment, replicating terror tactics used in Darfur between 2003 and 2005. Diplomatic efforts have produced no concrete results.

Since the outbreak of war, more than 9.5 million people have been internally displaced and about 4.3 million have sought refuge in neighboring countries, especially Egypt, South Sudan, and Chad. The total number of displaced people is therefore around 14 million, more than a quarter of the population.

More than half of them are under 18. According to the United Nations, the conflict has caused over 150,000 deaths since 2023, making it the most severe humanitarian and displacement crisis in the world.

Figure 2.

Atrocities and a war against civilians

Atrocities committed by the parties, particularly by the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur, have led to accusations of possible genocidal acts. Documented abuses include executions, ethnically targeted violence against non-Arab communities such as the Zaghawa and Masalit, targeted killings, systematic rape, and the destruction of entire neighborhoods.

Widespread sexual violence and the deliberate use of terror against civilians, including children and infants, demonstrate a shift toward a war against the population itself. Other coercive tools include obstructing humanitarian aid, attacking health workers and facilities, and using food deprivation as a weapon.

A large share of the population faces severe food shortages and famine risk. Long-term implications are profound. Over 8 million children have been deprived of education for more than 500 days, representing a generational loss. This is compounded by mass forced migration and widespread psychological trauma.

This reflects a recurring pattern. Successive military dictatorships and transitional governments have progressively weakened state structures, increasing the risk of external actors, driven by strategic and economic interests, pushing Sudan into forms of structural dependency.

After South Sudan’s secession in 2011 reduced oil reserves by 75% the government increasingly relied on another key resource, gold. Sudan is now among the top five gold producers in Africa, making it highly attractive to international actors.

Gold as the financial core of the war effort

In Sudan’s civil conflict, gold is not only a strategic economic resource but the material core of the power struggle between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan Armed Forces. Control over mining sites, refining infrastructure, and distribution channels is essential for financing military operations and consolidating political authority.

Gold revenues are used to purchase weapons, fuel, food, and other supplies. Since 2011, gold has replaced oil as the country’s main source of foreign currency.

Unlike the oil sector, gold production is largely artisanal. Small scale mining accounts for most national output and involves over one million Sudanese. This fragmented and informal structure makes regulation difficult and has facilitated the involvement of military forces, militias, and smuggling networks.

Under al-Bashir, the tamkeen policy created a kleptocratic system that granted economic privileges to military and security elites in exchange for loyalty. Smuggling became structural and strengthened autonomous armed actors.

After the regime’s fall and failed reforms aimed at auditing military linked businesses, economic interests became a central driver of conflict, contributing to the 2021 coup and the 2023 war.

The war has effectively divided the gold sector territorially. The Sudan Armed Forces control production mainly in Red Sea, Nile, and Northern states, while the Rapid Support Forces dominate mining areas in Darfur and West Kordofan.

Much of the gold is smuggled, especially to Egypt, while Rapid Support Forces controlled areas rely on artisanal production and networks linked to companies associated with the family of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.

Gold is therefore not simply a contested resource but the financial mechanism sustaining the war. Trade networks involve regional and international actors, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and China, creating interdependencies that fuel conflict rather than stability.

Figure 3.

Regional interests and future prospects

Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, along with regional powers such as Egypt, have significantly influenced the conflict by supporting different sides. Long term strategies in Sudan are tied to broader economic and geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

The Sudanese gold sector is embedded in wider exchanges involving fuel, agricultural land, food, and livestock. Gulf states have invested billions in agriculture and logistics infrastructure, including ports, to secure supply chains.

The United Arab Emirates appears more aligned with the Rapid Support Forces, while Saudi Arabia, although more inclined toward mediation, maintains implicit support for authorities linked to the Sudan Armed Forces. Their competition for influence in the Red Sea region weighs heavily on the conflict.

The overlap between internal geopolitical dynamics and external economic interests creates a conflict ecosystem in which gold functions as a strategic node fueling regional rivalries and prolonging the war.

It would be a serious mistake to interpret the Sudan war solely as a struggle between military factions for state control. It reflects deeper structural weaknesses, institutional fragility, extractive economic dependence, and international geopolitical competition.

Ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, and the systematic use of hunger as a weapon demonstrate the collapse of the political and social contract, as the conflict has become a war against the population.

Gold, instead of being a development opportunity, has become the main source of war financing and a magnet for external actors. There is a strong risk that Sudan will consolidate as a fragmented state lacking real economic and political sovereignty and embedded in patterns of structural dependency.

Without coordinated international intervention targeting the economic circuits that sustain the conflict, rather than limiting action to calls for a ceasefire, the prospects for stabilization remain extremely limited. Sudan’s future will depend on breaking the link between the war economy and military power, building inclusive institutions, and restoring centrality to the civilian population, the main victim of a competition whose dynamics extend beyond national borders.